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标题: 一篇ThinkPad早期發展史的文章 [打印本页]

作者: y3k 时间: 2006-10-18 15:19 标题: 一篇ThinkPad早期發展史的文章

Big Blue's Big Adventure

原著：Peter Golden

Part 1

在1991年，Denny Wainwright是IBM在佛羅里達的Boca Raton市的一個資深策劃人員。他所屬的工作小組正在研究一種portable tablet computer；那是一種讓使用者以筆在螢幕書寫、再將儲存的資訊以cable轉移到其它computer的系統。

這個小組不知該如何為此系統取名。IBM很喜歡把它的電腦都給個數字代號，好像只有這種聽起來像是George Jetson（譯註：美國的科幻卡通人物）發明的機器，才會得到使用者的重視一樣。雖然在IBM開始販售名為IBM PC的桌上型個人電腦時，就已經開始偏離這個傳統，但這仍幾乎是神聖不可侵犯的準則。即使如此，Wainwright的小組成員還是覺得數字編號對於他們的tablet computer來說，太不人性化。

雖然與一個典型的IBM人相比，該工作小組的成員很多都很年輕且隨性，但Wainwright仍像是一個屬於IBM早期時代的員工。他很紳士、穩重，永遠一成不變的穿著西裝打著領帶。在一個工作會議中，Wainwright拾起了他隨身攜帶的筆記本。IBM向來都會發這種小本子（pad）給員工，讓他們能夠隨時記下該做的事，或者更棒的是記下一些石破天驚的想法。這個大小適合放在襯衫口袋的小本子，以皮革為封套，上面以燙金印著IBM的口號：Think. Wainwright將這個代表IBM傳奇的小皮革本拿出來，說道：「就叫它 Thinkpad 吧.」

這個建議不僅僅是要在市場行銷上引人注意而已，它還把此 tablet computer和IBM的理念基礎結合在一起。到1991年的時候，"Think"僅剩下是IBM的市場行銷口號，但對於IBM的創始人Thomas Waton Sr. 來說，"Think"簡潔有力的代表了他對於理性主義的擁抱。在1915年，Watson告訴他的員工：「只要人們願意思考，世上所有的問題都可迎刃而解。」雖然幾年後殘酷的第一次世界大戰，直接挑戰了這個樂觀的想法，但Watson和他的兒子，Thomas Watson Jr., 仍依照這個對於理性的樂觀信念，打造IBM。這個信念表現在IBM慢條斯理、井然有序的產品開發過程、對客戶所需的痴心般的重視（而客戶乃由穿戴得一絲不苟的銷售部隊服務）、以及溫厚如大家長般的對於員工的照顧。一個有意思的對比是，這個後來成為「新IBM」以及即將來臨的21世紀標誌的Thinkpad，在很多方面都是紮根於IBM的過去，而這種開展的形式正是 Watson Sr.過去努力的結果。這篇文章的故事，就是關於這個有意思的對比，以及我們從觀察未來如何脫胎自過去，所能夠學到的一課。

Part 2

當IBM在1981年開始販賣PC之後，他們就一直嘗試讓個人電腦成為主流。然而IBM最終卻在PC市場上失去了主控權，而且在1985年之前都沒有讓可攜式電腦上市。在1985年的時候，可攜式電腦已經變的比較輕也比較小。Tandy這家公司已經利用TRS-80 Model 100(這是一台重量輕且內建文字編輯器及數據機的電腦)在市場上取得成功。1986年，Toshiba發表了最先進的可攜式電腦，這個電腦對市場造成了立即的衝擊。IBM隨後發表了5140 Convertible PC，不過最終這台機器只證明自己是台無用的機器，甚至可以說，這台機器只是一台過時科技下的無用產品。

1991年，Dataquest，一家位在San Jose的市場研究公司發表了一篇報告，這篇報告指出前一年(1990年)，前五大膝上型電腦供應商在全世界總共賣出了547,000台筆記型電腦。第一名(Toshiba)賣了230,000台，第二名(Compaq)與第一名相差無幾，賣了200,000台。IBM甚至還不在這份報告上，Jim Cannavino對這個結果感到很氣惱。

Cannavino曾是IBM的Entry Systems 部門(IBM PC CO.的前身)的總裁，可以說他跟這家公司是一同成長的。他在1963年的時候進入IBM，當時他還是個未滿20歲的青年，只有高中學歷，但卻有著修理大型電腦的天分。他不但在硬體方面表現傑出，連軟體方面也表現的很好，之後他升職成為lab director，而從那開始，他便穩定的爬上金字塔的最頂端。

對Cannavino來說，PC時代另他感到沮喪，尤其是做為與Bill Gates的戰爭中的主要角色，他所領導研發的OS/2最後敗給了微軟的Windows。但Cannavino發現了一個讓IBM切入「行動電腦戰場(mobile game，意指可攜式電腦市場)」的機會，當時他繪出了tablet computer的原型，後來這個原型由GO製造出來，GO這家新公司希望他們的軟體可以成為pen product的標準作業系統。”我要做的第一件事就是要換掉70%的執行者”Cannavino回憶道。Cannavino在1995年自IBM退休，現在是CyberSafe Corp(一家網路安全公司，位在華盛頓州的Issaquah)的CEO。”IBM的決策程序及發展周期對市場來說太過緩慢，而我換掉的執行者正是那些覺得「改變」是多餘的人”。之後Cannavino邀請Kathy Vieth這個具有豐富市場經驗的人來當副總，並且監督位在Boca Raton的portable and pen computing研發團隊。

“我認為Jim對於pen computer非常的了解”Vieth說到，現在Vieth已經自IBM退休並且住在科羅拉多州的Vail，在那裡，她擁有一家自己的顧問公司。”IBM的科學家很聰明，但要產品能夠成功，不一定需要聰明人，而是需要具有常識且精明幹練的人，那個人就是Jim Cannavino”

part 3

正當tablet的研發工作接近完成，且IBM準備向新聞界發表的時候，一場因Wainwright所引起的命名爭論則持續進行著。Pen-computing部門希望把這個新產品命名為ThinkPad，他們覺得為這樣一個個人化產品取個有意義的名字是非常重要的，這樣才不會讓消費者覺得他們非得從MIT(麻省理工學院)畢業才可以使用這樣的產品。

Debi Dell，這個部門的產品經理回憶道：IBM的命名委員會討厭ThinkPad這個名字。首先，他們對這個電腦不是用數字命名感到生氣。IBM的電腦怎麼可以沒有數字呢？再來，因為IBM在海外銷售很多產品，他們擔心要怎麼以其他語言來清楚的解釋ThinkPad這個名字。

當Vieth在1992年春天發表這個新的產品的時候，她刻意忽略了公司內部的反對聲浪，而將這個新產品命名為ThinkPad。

“新聞界喜歡這個名稱”Dell說道。”而且只要ThinkPad被大眾接受，這些反對者就會改變他們的立場。”

Tablet找到了新市場。根據Paul Carroll(Big Blues: The Unmaking of IBM的作者，該書於1993年由Crown Publisher Inc.出版)的觀察，市場已經起了變化，且變的”比較重視人們在移動時如何與其他人保持連結，而非只重視運算。”

而IBM就正好有這樣的筆記型電腦正在研發。事實上，再六個月，這個產品就要在市場上銷售，但在1992年年初，這個新產品還是沒有名字。

就在ThinkPad發表的前兩年，Cannavino相信將來的可移動式機器(意指各種可攜式電腦)都應該在位在日本Yamato的IBM設計中心研發。日本人對於消費性電子商品市場的敏感度比起美國人好太多，而且Cannavino覺得日本文化的優點是美國人學不來的。

Cannavino說明道：”在日本，你會發現同一公司中的競爭者會分享較多的科技給其他人，但在美國就不會這樣。日本人了解一個健全的公司對每個人都好，我們應該向他們多學學。”

之後，Cannavino被指派到日本的mobile development operation部門。Tom Hardy當時是IBM Design Program的corporate manager。Hardy親眼看著他們公司的行動電腦產品線在美國失敗而得到一個結論：對筆記型電腦這樣一個高度個人化的產品來說，美學至少和電腦內所包含的科技一樣重要。對一些IBM的人來說這可是異端學說。然而，翻開IBM的歷史，他們曾經與一些世界上最出名的工業設計師共事過，例如Eliot Noyes，他在IBM Selectric 打字機的設計上扮演了很重要的角色。

Part 4

另一位設計師是 Richard Sapper；他從1980年開始，就是IBM的工業設計顧問。Sapper 是德國人，在離開賓士車廠的工作後，到義大利的米蘭開了一間工作室，並且很快的就以簡約乾淨的設計線條而聞名，例如Tizio 燈（譯註：http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/ho/11/euwcm/ho_1988.236.10.htm ）以及其它曾在現代藝術博物館展出的作品。

當Tom Hardy在1989年開始負責IBM的 Design Program 時，他和Sapper為了想一個讓IBM產品有與眾不同風格的辦法，而有過無數次討論。他們將這個辦法稱為「個性化策略」，而這就是要加入創新而令人興奮的元素，以此來重新擦亮這個品牌。

在1990年春天，IBM開始著手進行一個notebook computer的開發工作。這個後來被稱為PS/55的notebook computer,是專門針對日本市場而開發。為此，他們在Sapper的米蘭住家/工作室舉行了一個會議；那工作室是在一棟可愛的老房子的最上面兩層。Hardy回憶道，當他乘坐內有一木製椅的舊式籠狀電梯上樓時，他發現這裡的環境比他在IBM的辦公室要令人愉悅得多了。除了Hardy和Sapper之外，參加會議的另有 Kazuhiko（和彥，名字) Yamazaki（山崎，姓氏），他是Yamato筆記型電腦的主要工業設計師，以及John Wiseman，他可以說是Cannavion的情報官。

Sapper認為此設計應要乾淨、簡單、而高雅。他以日本傳統、有光亮黑漆的松花堂便當盒為基礎，做了一個木作原型。它小巧而緊密。在日本，辦公桌的桌面空間向來吃緊，而安全性對notebook而言也是一個重要問題，因此一個便當盒大小的電腦，正可方便的鎖入檔案櫃中。

當設計告一段落之後，Cannavino選擇在日本──這個具有合作的企業環境──設廠的智慧，開始顯現出來。一些以前IBM的競爭對手或競爭對手的供給廠商，開始在這個計畫上一起合作。

曾在1994年發表有關Thinkpad發展的研究、現在是倫敦商學院訪問教授的Kiyonori Sakakibara說道：「Ricoh 公司負責。。。最主要的工作；它將電腦的兩片積體電路版緊密的裝配起來，而它們是緊密到兩面都有chips。Sharp Corp. 和其它公司則是提供黑白的液晶螢幕。」

在1991年春，PS/55 Note在日本市場發表，而且馬上熱賣。它僅略重於5磅，而那層黑色、柔軟、橡膠感的塗裝，在人們拿起這個 notebook時，給予很舒適的觸摸感。

Part 5

PS/55 Note的成功，與IBM的另一產品 PS/2 Laptop形成強烈對比；後者在更早的兩個星期前於歐洲和美國推出。這個搞砸的PS/2，是由IBM在Boca Raton的團隊所設計。

當IBM在1992年秋天推出歐規的PS/55 Note時，它同樣賣得很好。在該產品的設計和製造階段，Hardy都向Cannavino做簡報，現在Cannavino決定讓Sapper和Yamato團隊也為美國市場製造。兩年來，Cannavino一直為無法在這個具有數億美元商機的行動型電腦市場佔有一席之地，感到失望。他認為這個結果與該公司過去的歷史脫離不了關係。

「IBM花了3千萬美元，研究notebook的體積應該多大」，Cannavino 回憶道，「我最後說：這個商用市場已經決定了它的大小，那就是8.5英吋寬11英吋長，就像辦公室裡的所有其它東西一樣。」（譯註：舉例而言，美國用的列印紙的大小就是8.5英吋寬11英吋長，即所謂的letter size；這和台灣還有大部分其它國家慣用的A4 size不同。）

「花那樣的錢聽起來很瘋狂，但是IBM以前都是投注於研發週期很長的大型電腦主機，」Cannavino繼續說，「每個大型主機都要幾百萬美元，所以研究可讓它長久使用的設計，是有道理的。但是PCs和可攜式電腦基本上是大眾化商品，而它的研發週期短到只有6個月。」

「在1991年聖誕節之前，」Cannavino說，「我們在Yamato有個大型的會議，我跟這個團隊說，這個為美國市場開發的notebook，要在暑假之前完成。我的執行者沒人相信這可以做到，但我不同意，我說若有需要，我們都要留在日本──即使是聖誕節和新年也一樣──，直到我們能有法子達成這個目標。不用說，我們在聖誕夜之前就回到美國了。六個月，那是關鍵。我們必須在六個月內完成。」

當Sapper和日本團隊被迫在大幅縮短的時間表下工作時，他們完全沒想到，一個日後讓Thinkpad與眾不同的科技，現在正哀怨無用的躺在IBM的實驗室裡。

Part 6

軌跡點的發跡

Thinkpad系列的諸多創意中，沒有一個像軌跡點 ──那個鍵盤中的小紅點指向裝置── 那樣歷經如此困難才邁入Thinkpad的家門。如今，軌跡點是那麼具有代表性，IBM把廣告中Thinkpad的"i"的上面那點，以鮮紅色取代，而且在開機畫面中，也同樣有那紅點。但軌跡點是一個歷經八年努力的結果，而這個將創意變黃金的練金術過程，也讓一位執著的IBM科學家以及他的支持者，得到一些頗讓人氣餒的經驗。

在1984年，Ted Selker看到一項研究指出，電腦使用者花四分之三秒的時間把手從鍵盤移向滑鼠，再花另外四分之三秒把手移回來。Selker是Xerox的Palo Alto Research Center (PARC)的研究人員，他想說若他能建構一種滑鼠，讓使用者不必把手移來移去，這樣就能替他們節省時間和麻煩。Selker造了一個模型，在它鍵盤的"G"和"H"中間有一根凸起的指向桿，而在底部的邊上有兩個按鍵。不幸的是，Selker被賦予其它工作任務，因此他把模型束之高閣。

三年後，Selker成為IBM的科學家。他把模型給他的同事也是數學家 Joseph Rutledge看。Selker回憶道：「他很喜歡，所以我們就一起動手做。我們學到的第一件也是最令人傷心的事是，過去百年來的研究告訴我們，桿子作為指向工具，很不靈光。更令人沮喪的是，我們自己的研究顯示，手指和指頭壓力，是很沒有效率的的控制指標移動的方式。」

接下來的四年中，Selker 和 Rutledge製造了一個可用的原型。他們發現，如果能夠降低游標移動的速度，且讓桿子不那麼僵硬，那麼人們可以很準確而舒適的使用這個裝置。

「我當時認為指向桿的優勢顯而易見，」Selker說道，「你不使用滑鼠，可以增加20％的編輯文件的時間。我開始在IBM內部、會議、展覽秀場等處展示給人家看。很多人很討厭它。但我也找到一些支持者，例如John Cox，他是IBM榮譽科學家（IBM Fellow）。John有一次中風，他的同事們去醫院看他，問他需要什麼東西時，他說"給我一個 Ted Selker 的鍵盤"」。

Selker 和 Rutledge面臨到的一個嚴重問題是，自從IBM製造了Selectric品牌的打字機以來，IBM的鍵盤就很有名，而這個稈狀的指向裝置，破壞了此備受推崇的傳奇產品的整體感。此外，Selker 和 Rutledge很快就瞭解到，產品經理可以對一個新的發明給予關鍵的加持，但是產品經理通常都是風險趨避者：他們不是很願意支持尚未經過市場測試的產品。

Selker對這種現象，有第一手經驗。他記得有一次向一位高階經理展示這個新裝置，那高階經理立刻把這鍵盤帶到一個產品經理處，並且說道「這很棒，不是嗎？我們可以用它嗎？」

「當然，」那位產品經理回答，「只要我不需對我的損益表負責，那就當然沒問題。」

Selker的處境並不算特別。無數的IBM科學家的發明，從來就沒離開過實驗室。申請專利後，它們不是被認為沒有用處就是被認為沒有市場，然後就此煙沒在檔案櫃和盒箱中。

Part 7

對Selker來說是很幸運的，多年來，Cannavino對一些已被忽略的科技深深著迷。當時Cannavino是IBM個人系統部門的general manager，他總是習慣在週末的時候瀏覽一些已經被折角註記的檔案，並且希望能從這些檔案中找到一些有用的產品。

當他看到了pointing stick，Cannavino覺得他發現了新東西。對於一個人坐在筆記型電腦前，並且能夠有足夠空間使用滑鼠這件事他已經注意了很久。Cannavino並不喜歡由位在Yamato的IBM研發團隊所使用的解決方案─trackball。他弄到了Selker和Rutledge所做出的原型，並且插在自己的桌上型電腦測試。之後Cannavino打了通電話給Selker並對他說：”Ted，這東西太棒了，怎麼我們沒有用這東西呢?”

“他們不會讓我用的”Selker說。

“你知道嗎，Ted?”Cannavino回應道：”我就是「他們」”。

Selker因為這通電話而興奮不已。”Jim底下有大約100,000人替他工作”Selker說到。但就算是有Cannavino的支持也沒辦法保證pointing stick可以成為一個產品，所以Selker和Rutledge在科學期刊上發表了pointing stick的研究報告。

“在眾人的反對之下，我們完成了一份新聞稿”Selker說。”最後Business Week採用了這份新聞稿，因為雜誌是屬公司外的資訊，所以IBM的決策者注意到了這東西。”

同時，Hardy這邊也與Selker陣營同時為新電腦使用pointing stick這件事而戰。而且因為他的團隊管理過位於世界各地的15個研發中心，所以他們安排在日本IBM去推行這個概念。

“我也把pointing stick秀給PC Co.的頭頭Bob Corrigan看”Hardy說。”Bob覺的這東西非常的了不起，而Richard Sapper也這麼覺得。我們非常需要pointing stick節省空間的特性，更重要的是，pointing stick可以建立品牌形象，而且會讓IBM的產品在高度競爭的市場中與其他的產品區隔開。”

經過這些努力之後，pointing stick開始在日本測試，但還有最後一個障礙必須跨過，這個障礙是筆記型電腦產品經理─Toshiyuki Ikeda。

“我看了trackpoint的第一個原型，而它與trackball並不一樣。”現在是IBM OEM System Development主管的Ikeda回憶道。”我很不願意去支持一個全新的構想。但後來一份測試人員的評論中提到trackball已經被Apple使用，而該評論也同樣提醒了我們的競爭者的測試人員。我覺得我應該做一些不一樣的事，所以我做了這個決定。Ted Selker在短短幾個月內完成了一份極重要的工作。我們在日本的DIY店內尋找了許多不同的零件。”

對Selker及Rutledge來說，將他們所發明的東西轉變成實際的產品結果另人非常的滿意。”這件事讓我了解到一個公司應該要提供獎勵計劃給科學家，好讓這些科學家成為改革的承包者。”Selker說。

Part 8

Sapper還建議TrackPoint做最後一項改變。Selker及Rutledge所設計的pointing stick的頂端是黑色的，這個顏色老是讓人在同是黑色的ThinkPad鍵盤中找不到pointing stick。Sapper說：”讓它凸顯出來吧。”然後TrackPoint的頂端就改成紅色的了。

Hardy解釋說：”IBM對於標準非常的看重，而且他們也說了，產品上唯一可用的紅色零件是緊急電源按鈕。讓Trackpoint的頂端去服從這個標準是非常可笑的一件事，但是，以IBM的狀況來說，我們知道這個小紅點是不可能通過整個系統的審核，所以我們把色調給調暗下來，並稱它是紅紫色(magenta)。” (譯註：根據Collins COBUILD這本字典的解釋，Magenta是dark reddish-purple，所是較深的紅紫色)

不久之後，設計師Yamazaki收到了一通IBM標準監督人員打來的電話，這位監督人員想知道為什麼製造廠做出這些紅色小零件。

Yamazaki說：”它們不是紅色。它們是紅紫色。”

”不”標準監督人員回應說：”它們是紅色。”

這兩個人來來回回爭論了很多次，最後打電話給Hardy來決定這場爭議的對錯。

“它們不是紅色，它們應該是紅紫色。”Hardy向標準監督者保證，這卻引發出一場閒聊般的、哲學性的在實體論上對紅色定義的辯論。不過，標準監督人員仍堅持他們的立場 ─ 不准有紅色，就算是稱它們為紅紫色也一樣。

Hardy建議將這個爭論升高到較高的等級討論，他有信心讓標準監督人員在地位較高的管理階層前面討論這些芝麻蒜皮的小事時會退縮。而這場爭論的確就這樣結束了。pointing stick的頂端仍維持原來的顏色，而且在接下來的幾年中，只要發表新的ThinkPad，橡膠頂端的顏色便逐漸變亮直到最後變成廠牌標示上的亮紅色。

完

作者: y3k 时间: 2006-10-18 15:21

原文

Big Blue's big adventure
Peter Golden -- 1/1/1999
Electronic Business

In 1991, Denny Wainwright was a senior planner at IBM Corp. in Boca Raton, FL. Wainwright was part of the small group working on a portable tablet computer: a pen-based system that permitted users to write on a screen, save the information and transfer it to other computers by a cable.

The group was having trouble finding a name for the product. IBM had a strong preference for its computers to be designated by numbers, as if only machines that sounded like they had been invented by George Jetson would be taken seriously by customers. The company had deviated from this tradition when it started selling its desktop PC, calling it the IBM PC, but the policy was still almost sacrosanct. Even so, the members of Wainwright's group felt that a number was too impersonal for their tablet computer.

Although many working on the project were young and more casual than the prototypical IBMer, Wainwright was a throwback to an earlier era at Big Blue. He was a gentle, formal man, invariably dressed in a suit and tie. At a meeting, Wainwright held up the small notepad he always carried. IBM used to issue the pads so employees could jot down to-do lists, or, better yet, earth-shaking ideas. The pad, which was designed to fit into a dress-shirt pocket, was bound in leather and embossed in gold with the IBM motto, "Think." Displaying the little leather legacy of IBM's past, Wainwright said, "Let's call it the Think pad."

The suggestion was more than a catchy bit of marketing. It connected the tablet computer to the philosophical foundations of the company. By 1991, "Think" had become mainly a marketing mantra at IBM, but, for founder Thomas Watson Sr., it epitomized his devout rationalism. In 1915, Watson told employees: "All the problems of the world could be solved easily if men were only willing to think." Within a few years this optimism would be challenged by the brutality of World War I. But, Watson and his son, Thomas Watson Jr., molded IBM in accordance with the rationalist's cheerful faith, which manifested itself as a slow-moving, orderly approach to product development, an obsessive concern for the needs of the customers (which were tended by an impeccably groomed sales force) and a benevolent paternalism toward employees. Ironically, the ThinkPad, which would become symbolic of the "new IBM" and the approaching 21st century, was in many ways rooted in the company's past, a result of a process first expounded by Watson Sr. This story is about that irony, and the lessons to be learned if we are patient enough to watch the future emerge from the past.

IBM helped push the personal computer into the mainstream when it began selling its PC in 1981. Eventually, though, it lost control of the PC marketplace, and didn't bring a portable to market until 1985. By then, portables were already becoming smaller and lighter. Tandy had scored in the market with its TRS-80 Model 100, a compact, lightweight computer with an integrated word processor and modem. In 1986, Toshiba unveiled a state-of-the-art portable line that became an immediate hit. IBM followed with the 5140 Convertible PC, but it proved to be nothing but an expensive doorstop made of dated technology.

In 1991, Dataquest, the San Jose-based market research firm, reported that during the previous year the top five laptop vendors had shipped 547,000 notebook computers worldwide. Toshiba led the way with 230,000, and Compaq Computer wasn't far behind at 200,000. IBM wasn't even on the list, and Jim Cannavino was annoyed about that.

Cannavino was president of IBM's Entry Systems Division, a predecessor of the IBM PC Co., and until then his career had run parallel with the company's glory days. He had started out in 1963, a teenager with a high-school diploma and a talent for repairing mainframes. He proved equally adept with software and was promoted to lab director, where he began his steady rise through the hierarchy.

For Cannavino, the PC-era was frustrating, particularly his stint as the point man in IBM's battle with Bill Gates over the jointly developed OS/2 operating system, which eventually lost to Microsoft's Windows. But Cannavino saw an opportunity for IBM to get into the mobile game when he spotted a prototype of a tablet computer. It had been produced by GO, a start-up that was hoping its software would become the standard operating system for pen products. "One of the first things I had to do was replace 70% of my executives," recalls Cannavino, who retired from IBM in 1995 and is currently CEO and chairman of CyberSafe Corp. of Issaquah, WA, a network security provider. "The decision-making process and development time at IBM were too slow for the market, and the executives I replaced were the ones who didn't believe change was required." Cannavino asked Kathy Vieth, a vice president with wide-ranging marketing experience, to oversee the portable- and pen-computing development team in Boca Raton.

"I thought Jim was onto something with the pen computer," says Vieth, who today is retired from IBM and lives in Vail, CO, where she runs her own consulting business. "IBM scientists are brilliant, but you don't necessarily need brilliant for successful products. You need common sense and street smarts. That was Jim Cannavino."

The name game

As the tablet neared completion and IBM was preparing to announce it to the press, a battle was still going on over Wainwright's suggested name. The pen-computing group wanted to call it ThinkPad. It felt that it was crucial for such a personal product to be named something that would not make consumers feel as if they had to graduate from MIT in order to use it.

Debi Dell, who was a product manager in the group, recalls: "IBM's corporate naming committee hated 'ThinkPad.' First, they were upset that the computer didn't have a number. How could an IBM computer not have a number? Then, since IBM sold so many products overseas, they were worried because ThinkPad wouldn't translate easily into foreign languages."

When Vieth announced the product in the spring of 1992, she ignored the corporate objections and simply referred to the tablet as the ThinkPad.

"The press loved it," says Dell. "And as soon as 'ThinkPad' caught on with people, the naysayers changed their tune."

But the tablet found few buyers. As Paul Carroll, author of Big Blues: The Unmaking of IBM (Crown Publishers Inc., 1993), observes, the market had shifted again and become "more focused on helping people communicate while on the move, rather than compute."

It so happened that IBM had that type of notebook computer under development. In fact, the company was just six months away from releasing it. But in early 1992, this computer also didn't have a name.

Two years before the tablet ThinkPad was announced, Cannavino became convinced that future mobile machines should be developed at the IBM design center in Yamato, Japan. The Japanese were more experienced with consumer electronics than the Americans, and Cannavino felt their culture provided them with an advantage that could not be duplicated in the United States.

Cannavino explains: "In Japan, you'll find that competitors share more technical information among themselves than departments do in a [U.S.] company. The Japanese understand that a healthy industry is good for everyone. We haven't quite learned that lesson over here."

At the time Cannavino was relocating the mobile development operation to Japan, Tom Hardy was corporate manager of the IBM Design Program. Hardy had watched his company's portable line fail in the United States, and concluded that the aesthetics of a product as highly personal as a notebook computer was at least as important as the technology it contained. For some at IBM this was heresy. Yet IBM also had a history of working with some of the world's most distinguished industrial designers--Eliot Noyes, for instance, who played a lead role in the design of the IBM Selectric typewriter.

Another of these designers was Richard Sapper. Since 1980, Sapper had been an industrial design consultant to IBM. A German by birth, Sapper left his job at Mercedes, set up a studio in Milan, Italy, and promptly became famous for the spare, clean lines of his work--for instance, the Tizio lamp--and other designs that have been exhibited at the Museum of Modern Art.

In 1989, when Tom Hardy began managing the Design Program, he and Sapper had numerous discussions about a method for differentiating IBM products. They referred to it as the "personality strategy," which would attempt to add some excitement and innovation in order to rebuild the brand.

In the spring of 1990, preliminary work began on a notebook computer that was aimed solely at the Japanese market and would be known as the PS/55 Note. A meeting was held at Sapper's apartment/studio in Milan, the top two floors of a lovely, old apartment house. Hardy recalls riding up in a cage elevator with a wooden seat and thinking that his surroundings were far more pleasant than an IBM office. Hardy and Sapper were joined by Kazuhiko Yamazaki, the lead industrial designer of notebooks at Yamato, and an executive named John Wiseman, who was serving as Cannavino's eyes and ears.

Sapper felt that the design should be clean, plain and elegant. His wooden prototype was based on the shoukadou bentou, the traditional, black-lacquered, Japanese lunch box. It was small and compact. Desk space is scarce in Japan, and, since security is an issue with notebooks, a computer the size of a bentou box could be locked in a filing cabinet.

After the design phase was completed, the wisdom of Cannavino's decision to produce the notebook in the cooperative corporate environment of Japan began to be realized. Several firms who competed with IBM or supplied its competitors, collaborated on the project.

According to Kiyonori Sakakibara, a visiting professor at the London Business School, who in 1994 published a study of ThinkPad development: "Ricoh Co. Ltd. performed . . . the most critical task, assembling the computer's two circuit boards, so densely packed that each [had] chips on both sides. The black-and-white liquid crystal display was supplied by Sharp Corp. and other Japanese manufacturers."

In the spring of 1991, the PS/55 Note was released in Japan and became a best seller. It weighed barely over five pounds, and the coating of soft, black, rubberized paint provided a pleasant tactile sensation when you picked up the notebook.

The success of the PS/55 Note was in stark contrast to IBM's PS/2 Laptop, which had been released two weeks earlier in Europe and the United States. The PS/2 had been designed by the IBM team in Boca Raton, and it flopped.

In the fall of 1992, when IBM released a European version of the PS/55 Note, it also sold well. Cannavino had been briefed by Hardy during the design and manufacturing of the new notebook, and Cannavino decided to have Sapper and the Yamato team create one for the U.S. market. For two years, Cannavino had been disappointed by IBM's inability to cut itself a meaningful slice of the billions being spent on mobile computers. He saw the problem as the inevitable result of the company's history.

"IBM had spent something like $30 million studying what size to make a notebook," recalls Cannavino. "I finally said, 'The business market has already decided what size they want it to be--81/2 by 11, like everything else in an office.'

"Spending that kind of a money on such a simple question sounds crazy, but IBM was geared to the lengthy development cycles of mainframes," Cannavino continues. "Each mainframe cost millions, so it made sense to study the design for a long time. But PCs and portables were basically consumer products, and the development cycle was moving down to about six months.

"Right before Christmas in 1991," Cannavino says, "we had a big meeting in Yamato, and I told the team I wanted the notebook done for the United States by summer. None of my executives thought it could be done. I disagreed and said we were staying in Japan--through Christmas and New Year's if necessary--until we worked it out. Needless to say we were back in the States before Christmas Eve. Six months, that was the key. We had to be done in six months."

As Sapper and the Japanese team went to work on the new notebook, forced to keep to Cannavino's drastically shortened timetable, they had no idea one of the key technologies that would differentiate the ThinkPad was languishing, unused, in IBM's labs.

TrackPoint's progress

No feature had a harder time finding a home in what would become the ThinkPad line than the TrackPoint, the red-tipped pointing stub embedded in the keyboard. Today, the TrackPoint is so symbolic of the brand that IBM places a bright red dot over the "i," in ThinkPad advertisements and brings up the same dot on the opening screens of its notebooks. Yet the TrackPoint is the result of an eight-year journey that taught one persistent IBM scientist and his supporters some frustrating lessons about the alchemy of turning corporate innovation into gold.

In 1984, Ted Selker read a study that showed it took three-quarters of a second for a computer user to shift his hand from the keyboard to the mouse, and another three-quarters of a second to shift it back again. Selker was a researcher at the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (PARC). He thought that if he could construct a mouse that didn't require users to move their hands, he would save them time and trouble. Selker built a model containing a pointing stick jutting up between the "G" and "H" on a desktop keyboard, with two click buttons set into the bottom edge. Unfortunately, Selker had other assignments, and he put his model on the shelf.

Three years later, Selker was working as a scientist for IBM, and showed the prototype to his colleague, Joseph Rutledge, a mathematician. Selker recalls: "He loved it, and we went to work. The first and saddest thing we learned was that 100 years of research says that sticks are not good at pointing. Then we got even more depressed when our own study demonstrated that finger-pressure control was an inefficient way to move a pointer around a screen."

Over the next four years, Selker and Rutledge produced a functioning prototype, discovering that if they slowed down the cursor and made the movements of the stick less stiff, then people were able to use it accurately and comfortably.

"I thought the pointing stick was an obvious idea," says Selker. "You could get about 20% more editing time without handling a mouse. I started showing it around IBM, and at conferences and trade shows. A lot of people hated it. I did find some supporters, like John Cox, an IBM Fellow. John had a stroke and when some of his co-workers visited him in the hospital and asked if he wanted anything, John said, 'Get me one of Ted Selker's keyboards.' "

A significant problem Selker and Rutledge faced was that since the days of the Selectric typewriter, IBM has been renowned for its keyboards, and the pointing stick violated the integrity of this revered legacy. In addition, Selker and Rutledge soon realized that a product manager was the one person who had the power to bestow a meaningful blessing on an invention, but product managers also tended to be risk-averse--reluctant to approve features not tested in the marketplace.

Selker observed this phenomenon first-hand. He remembers demonstrating the new device for an executive high up the ladder who immediately carried the keyboard to a product manager and said, "Isn't this great? Can we make it?"

"Absolutely," the product manager replied. "As long as I'm not responsible for my P and L's."

Selker's situation wasn't unique. Numerous inventions of IBM scientists never escaped the lab. They were patented, and then deemed either useless or unmarketable, and left to languish in filing cabinets and boxes.

IBM's X-Files?

Fortunately for Selker, Jim Cannavino had been fascinated by the neglected technology for years. At the time, Cannavino was general manager of IBM's Personal Systems Group, and on weekends he used to browse through dog-eared files hoping to uncover a useful product.

When he read about the pointing stick, Cannavino thought he saw something. He had long been concerned about how you could sit on a plane with a notebook computer and have enough room to manipulate the mouse. Cannavino disliked the current solution used by the IBM development team in Yamato--the trackball. He got himself one of Selker's and Rutledge's working prototypes, plugged it into his desktop computer and tested it. Then he phoned Selker and said, "Ted, this is great. How come we're not using it?"

"They won't let me," Selker said.

"Guess what, Ted," Cannavino replied. "I'm 'they.' "

Selker was thrilled by the call. "Jim had about 100,000 people working for him," says Selker, but even Cannavino's support didn't guarantee that the pointing stick would become a product, so Selker and Rutledge published their pointing-stick research in a scientific journal.

"Then we did a press release over everyone's dead body," says Selker. "BusinessWeek picked it up, and since the magazine is outside the company, IBM executives took notice."

Meanwhile, running parallel to Selker's campaign, Hardy was championing the pointing stick for the new notebook, and because his group oversaw the company's 15 design centers around the world, they were positioned to push the concept at IBM Japan.

"I also showed it to Bob Corrigan, who was head of the PC Co.," says Hardy. "Bob thought it was terrific, and so did Richard Sapper. We really needed the space-saving feature of the pointing stick, but, more important, using it would build brand image and give IBM product differentiation in a highly competitive market."

As a result of all these efforts, the pointing stick was put into testing in Japan, but there was one last hurdle for it to clear, the approval of Toshiyuki Ikeda, the notebook's product manager.

"I saw the first prototype of the TrackPoint, and it was not the equal of the trackball," recalls Ikeda, currently the director of OEM System Development for IBM. "I was reluctant to support a brand-new idea. But then a tester commented that the trackball is used by Apple, and it reminded the tester of our competitor's computers. Then I knew I had to do something different, so I made the decision. Ted Selker did a super job within a couple of months. We ran around to do-it-yourself shops in Japan searching for different types of parts."

For Selker and Rutledge, the transformation of their invention into a product was enormously satisfying. "What it taught me is that companies should have incentive programs for their scientists to become entrepreneurs [for their innovations]," says Selker.

Red badge of novelty

One final change made to the TrackPoint was suggested by Sapper. The tip of Selker's and Rutledge's pointing stick had been black, a color that got lost in the black ThinkPad keyboard. Sapper said, "Let it sing," and the tip was changed to red, which brought about a closing act of corporate silliness rivaled only by Abbott and Costello trying to decide who's on first.

Hardy explains: "IBM had a cherished standard which said that the only thing that could be red on a product was an emergency power switch, those enormous switches on the mainframes. To have the little TrackPoint tip subjected to this same standard was absurd, but, given the situation at IBM then, we knew the red dot wouldn't get through the system. So we toned it down a shade and called it magenta."

Soon afterward, Designer Yamazaki received a call from an IBM standards watchdog, who wanted to know why manufacturing had produced these tiny red parts.

Yamazaki said, "They're not red. They're magenta."

"No," replied the watchdog. "They're red."

The two men battled back and forth, then phoned Hardy to adjudicate the argument.

"They aren't red, they're magenta," Hardy assured the standards overseer, which led to a rambling, philosophical debate on the ontology of redness. Still, the watchdog held his position--no red allowed, not even if you called it magenta.

Hardy suggested that they take the argument to a higher level, confident that the watchdog would shrink from continuing such a trivial discussion with senior management. That was how it played out. The tip kept its magenta classification, and in the coming years, with the introduction of each new ThinkPad, the color of the rubber tip was increased a shade until it finally became a bright red symbol of the brand.